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Abstract
This study measured event-related brain potentials (ERPs) to test competing hypotheses regarding the effects of
anger and race on early visual processing (N1, P2, and N2) and error recognition (ERN and Pe) during a sequentially
primed weapon identification task. The first hypothesis was that anger would impair weapon identification in a biased
manner by increasing attention and vigilance to, and decreasing recognition and inhibition of weapon identification
errors following, task-irrelevant Black (compared to White) faces. Our competing hypothesis was that anger would
facilitate weapon identification by directing attention toward task-relevant stimuli (i.e., objects) and away from taskirrelevant stimuli (i.e., race), and increasing recognition and inhibition of biased errors. Results partially supported
the second hypothesis, in that anger increased early attention to faces but minimized attentional processing of race,
and did not affect error recognition. Specifically, angry (vs. neutral) participants showed increased N1 to both Black
and White faces, ablated P2 race effects, and topographically restricted N2 race effects. Additionally, ERN amplitude
was unaffected by emotion, race, or object type. However, Pe amplitude was affected by object type (but not emo‑
tion or race), such that Pe amplitude was larger after the misidentification of harmless objects as weapons. Finally,
anger slowed overall task performance, especially the correct identification of harmless objects, but did not impact
task accuracy. Task performance speed and accuracy were unaffected by the race of the face prime. Implications are
discussed.
Keywords: Anger, Race, Bias, Threat, EEG, N1, P2, N2, ERN, Pe
Significance statement
The murder of Amadou Diallo, an innocent Black man, on
February 4th, 1999 by four plain clothes New York City
police officers served as a reminder that racially biased
policing continued to plague the United States (U.S.),
despite many White Americans’ beliefs that the U.S. had
moved past racial injustice. The murder of George Floyd
on May 25th, 2020 by Minneapolis police reminds us
that racially biased policing remains a systemic issue that
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continues to kill Black and brown Americans to this day.
While racially biased policing takes many different forms,
and is influenced by many historical, economic, social,
and psychological factors, the present research homes
in on two basic psychological effects that may contribute to race-based shooter bias (e.g., a decision to shoot
an unarmed Black person). These are the threat superiority effect (the propensity to quickly attend to threatening
vs. non-threatening stimuli) and the weapon bias effect
(the tendency to misidentify harmless objects as weapons
when paired with Black people). In the current study, we
go a step further and examine whether anger impacts the
threat superiority effect and weapon bias effect through
a neurocognitive lens. Using a sequential priming task,

© The Author(s) 2021. Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which
permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the
original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or
other third party material in this article are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line
to the material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory
regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this
licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.

Rivera‑Rodriguez et al. Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications

we examine how anger influences the neural correlates
of race processing and error recognition, consistent with
threat superiority or weapon bias, among a sample of
undergraduate students. By identifying social cognitive
processes influenced by anger, we hope to inform future
research on racially biased decision making relevant to
policing.

Introduction
Rapidly identifying threatening stimuli in one’s environment is pivotal for survival. As such, it is no surprise that
research on attentional vigilance consistently shows people have a propensity to attend more quickly to negatively
valanced stimuli compared to positive ones (Dijksterhuis
& Aarts, 2003; Pratto & John, 1991; Wentura et al., 2000;
Williams et al., 1996). This phenomenon, better known as
the threat superiority effect, has traditionally been examined with evolutionarily relevant threats (e.g., snakes
and spiders) (Fox and Damjanovic, 2006; Öhman, 1993;
Öhman & Mineka, 2001). However, recent research has
found similar effects in response to modern threats (e.g.,
guns and syringes) that in some cases are stronger than
responses to evolutionarily relevant threats (Blanchette,
2006; Fox et al., 2007; Subra et al., 2018). Indeed, our ability to quickly attend to and identify threatening stimuli
in contemporary urban life is arguably more important
for survival in the twenty-first century than vigilance to
spiders or snakes. However, the threat superiority effect
can also be maladaptive in certain situations. Consider
for example the killing of Amadou Diallo, an unarmed
Black man fatally shot by four New York City police officers who misidentified Diallo’s wallet for a gun. In this
situation, the threat superiority effect drove the misidentification of a harmless wallet as a threatening weapon; a
mistake that cost Diallo, an innocent man, his life.
At the time, questions were raised as to whether
Diallo’s race influenced the killing, motivating social
psychologists to examine whether racial stereotypes
associating Blacks with violence affect visual object processing (Baumann & DeSteno, 2010; Correll et al., 2002,
2006; Payne, 2001). Early research developed laboratory analogs to examine whether race primes (e.g., visual
images of Black and White individuals) affected accuracy
on speeded weapon detection and revealed a weapon
bias effect (Payne, 2001). Racial stereotypes linking Black
men with threat biased individuals’ responses on the
weapon identification task, such that they were more
likely to misidentify harmless objects as weapons after
seeing Black (compared to White) faces. The weapon bias
effect, which has since been replicated in multiple studies (Payne, 2001; Payne et al., 2005; Correll et al., 2002;
Correll et al., 2007), has proven invaluable in furthering
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our understanding of how race and racial stereotypes
inappropriately influence perception and judgment in
ways that make the threat superiority effect maladaptive.
However, other social psychological factors that magnify threat, such as emotions, have not been examined as
deeply.
Emotions play a functional role in helping humans
navigate social life and influence the degree to which stereotypes guide social judgments (DeSteno et al., 2004;
Dasgupta et al., 2009; Bodenhausen et al., 2001). Negative emotions, like anger, are of particular interest in the
context of both the threat superiority and weapon bias
effects. Anger is known to facilitate automatic responses
in threatening situations (Scott, 1980), increasing the
likelihood of misidentifying harmless objects as weapons
during a weapon detection task (Baumann & Desteno,
2010). Moreover, anger also motivates heuristic processing during social judgment tasks (Bodenhausen et al.,
1994), facilitating the activation of racial stereotypes that
drive the weapon bias effect (Unkelbach et al., 2008).
Together, this research suggests that anger primes threat
sensitivity and activates stereotypes, increasing the likelihood that harmless objects will be misidentified as weapons, especially after seeing a Black (compared to a White)
face, and may have real-life implications for law enforcement officers.
Alternatively, anger may have a different effect on
social judgments because of its link to goals and motivation. Specifically, anger motivates approach behavior,
(Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009; Harmon-Jones, 2019;
Harmon-Jones et al., 2003; Peterson et al., 2008; 2011;
Harmon-Jones, 2004), goal-oriented behavior (Schmitt
et al., 2019), and persistence (Lench & Levine, 2008;
Seckler et al., 2017). Anger facilitates goal attainment and
task performance by focusing attentional and memory
resources toward task-relevant stimuli and away from
task-irrelevant stimuli (Harmon-Jones, 2019). Thus, it is
possible that anger may actually improve performance on
a weapon identification task by: (1) focusing attention on
task-relevant objects, (2) shunting attention away from
task-irrelevant race primes and reducing activation of
associated stereotypes, and/or (3) increasing sensitivity
to errors consistent with the threat superiority effect (i.e.,
misidentifying harmless objects as weapons) or errors
consistent with the weapon bias effect (i.e., misidentifying harmless objects as weapons after seeing Black faces).
This leads to two competing hypotheses about the
possible effects of anger on race and object processing, as well as overall performance, during a weapon
identification task. The first hypothesis is based on the
links between anger, threat sensitivity, and stereotype
activation:
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(H1) Anger will increase attention and vigilance
toward Black (compared to White) faces and
decrease sensitivity to errors consistent with threat
superiority and weapon bias effects, leading to
slower identification of harmless objects (compared
to weapons) as well as greater misidentification of
harmless objects (compared to weapons) following
Black face primes.
The second hypothesis is based on the link between
anger and goal attainment motivation:
(H2) Anger will improve task performance by
decreasing attention and vigilance toward irrelevant
face stimuli, increasing attention to relevant object
stimuli, and increasing sensitivity to errors consistent with threat superiority and weapon bias effects,
leading to faster identification of both weapons and
harmless objects as well as less difference in misidentification of harmless objects (compared to weapons)
following Black and White face primes.
While a significant amount of research has examined
how race processing can influence performance on the
weapon identification task (Amodio et al., 2004; Amodio et al., 2008, Correll et al., 2006), very few studies have
examined how anger influences weapon identification by
modulating attentional orientation and vigilance toward
racial cues or sensitivity to errors. In the current study,
we induced participants to experience anger or calmness, and recorded electroencephalography (EEG), while
they performed a weapon identification task to assess the
impact of anger on different aspects of race and object
processing. In so doing, we aim to shed light on the
impact of anger on specific cognitive processes involved
in object identification in order to better inform how
emotion and race influence split-second perceptions and
decisions that have implications for real-world situations.
In the following sections, we briefly review (1) behavioral evidence demonstrating the weapon bias effect, (2)
neural correlates of visual processing associated with
attention and vigilance to race and racial stereotypes,
and (3) neural processing of errors consistent with the
weapon bias effect. We also review existing emotion
studies to support our competing hypotheses regarding
the possible effects of anger on neural correlates involved
in visual and error processing during a weapon identification task.
Behavioral evidence in support of the weapon bias effect

The effects of racial cues on weapon identification have
been an important research topic among social psychologists for the last two decades. In a landmark study, Payne
(2001) created a sequential priming task to demonstrate
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that the race of primes (i.e., Black and White faces) influences the magnitude of the threat superiority effect. Specifically, Payne showed that participants were faster to
identify guns, and slower to identify tools, after exposure
to Black compared to White faces. Furthermore, Black
(but not White) face primes increased misidentification
of harmless tools as weapons when participants were
pressured to respond quickly. Using the process dissociation procedure (Jacoby, 1991)—a method of quantifying
the extent to which performance on various cognitive
tasks is driven by automatic vs. controlled processes—
Payne (2001) revealed that the weapon bias effect was
driven by the automatic associations linking Black men
with handguns.
In a related paradigm, Correll et al. (2002) examined
the effect of race on participants’ decisions to “shoot”
armed targets or “not shoot” unarmed targets in a simulated first-person shooter task. Like Payne’s (2001)
weapon identification task, Correll’s shooter task illuminated racial biases in response times, such that participants’ decision to shoot Black armed targets was faster
than their decision to shoot White armed targets. Conversely, when the target was unarmed, participants took
longer in their decision to not shoot when the target was
Black compared to White. Similar to Payne (2001), pressures to respond quickly during the shooter bias task led
to a significant increase in racially biased mistakes (i.e.,
shooting an unarmed Black target). In exploratory analyses, Correll found that knowledge of cultural stereotypes
associating Blacks with danger (not necessarily personal
endorsement of such stereotypes) predicted stronger
racial bias on the task.
While the above-mentioned studies vary in detail, the
conclusions regarding the influence of race on the threat
superiority effect are consistent. First, the presence of a
racial cue (whether presented as a prime, or simultaneously with the target stimulus) systematically biases the
time it takes to correctly identify objects as either harmless (e.g., tool), or dangerous (e.g., gun), such that stereotype congruent pairings (i.e., Black—gun, White—tool)
are processed faster than stereotype incongruent pairings
(i.e., Black—tool, White—gun). Second, racially biased
responses result from individuals’ knowledge of societal
stereotypes associating Blacks with danger, regardless of
their personal endorsement of such stereotypes. Third,
external pressure to respond quickly compromises cognitive control processes necessary to overcome bias, allowing automatic stereotypes associating Black Americans
with threat to contaminate participants’ judgments of
objects as dangerous even when they are not, resulting in
higher error rates for stereotypically incongruent pairings
(Black—tool) compared to congruent pairings (Black—
gun). Together, these findings hint at the cognitive
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processes of stereotype activation and subsequent failure to control that leads to racially biased responding on
weapon identification tasks.
Neural indices of visual attention and cognitive control

The current study used EEG techniques to examine
event-related brain potentials (ERP) associated with
attention allocation (N1 and P2) and controlled inhibition (N2) processes in response to race stimuli on a
weapon detection task (Mangun & Hillyard, 1987, 1991).
The visually evoked N1 is a negative-going ERP component peaking approximately 150–200 ms after event
onset. The visually evoked P2 is a positive-going ERP
component peaking approximately 200 ms after event
onset. It is well documented that while the visual N1 and
P2 covary, they are distinct components (Luck & Kappenman, 2011) associated with early attention allocation (N1; Mangun & Hillyard, 1987, 1991) and sustained
attention/feature selection (P2; Anllo-Vento et al., 1998;
Hillyard & Münte, 1984) processes respectively.
The visually evoked N1 component is understood to be
modulated by selective attention to visual stimuli, (Luck
& Kappenman, 2011). N1 amplitude reflects attentional
allocation based on spatial location (Mangun, 1995;
Mangun & Hillyard, 1987, 1991), as well as low-level
characteristics (e.g., luminance; Johannes et al., 1995) of
visual stimuli, with larger amplitudes elicited over both
posterior and anterior scalp regions by attended stimuli
(Eason, 1981; Harter & Aine, 1984; Hillyard & Münte,
1984; Hillyard et al., 1998). Furthermore, it has been
shown that N1 amplitudes are sensitive to attentional
focus (i.e., focusing attention completely on a single task
vs. dividing attention across multiple tasks). For example,
Mangun and Hillyard (1990) showed that N1 amplitudes
were larger when participants were instructed to provide
100% of their attention to detect target stimuli at a single
spatial location, compared to when instructed to divide
their attention to detect target stimuli across multiple
spatial locations. Researchers interpret this attentional
modulation of the visual N1 component as evidence of
‘sensory gain control’, a term referring to the neurocognitive mechanisms involved in increasing or decreasing
attention toward tasks relevant and irrelevant cues (also
referred to as ‘amplification’; Hillyard et al., 1998).
The anterior visually evoked P2 component is understood to reflect attention to stimuli features such as
color, orientation, and size (Anllo-Vento et al., 1998; Hillyard & Münte, 1984; Luck & Hillyard, 1994), with larger
amplitudes elicited by attention to task-relevant stimuli
features. For example, research by Hillyard and Münte
(1984) examined N1 and P2 sensitivity to stimulus color
at attended vs. unattended spatial locations. While N1
amplitudes were unaffected by stimulus color at both
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attended and unattended spatial regions, P2 amplitudes
were larger in response to attended stimuli color, but only
at attended spatial regions. At unattended spatial regions,
P2 amplitude did not differ in response to attended vs.
unattended color. These findings suggest that attention
to stimuli features (indexed by the visually evoked P2
component) is contingent on, but functionally different from, early attention allocation processes (indexed
by visually evoked N1 components) (Hillyard & Münte,
1984; Luck & Kappenman, 2011), and suggests that the
visually evoked P2 component may also index sustained
attention.
The visually evoked N2 is a negative-going ERP component peaking approximately 200–350 ms after event
onset. Like the N1 and P2, the N2 is associated with
attentional allocation (Eimer, 1993; Hickey et al., 2006;
Luck & Hillyard, 1994), but has also been linked to
research on novelty and mismatch (Folstein & Van Petten,
2008; Folstein et al., 2008; Patel & Azzam 2005). Anteriorly distributed N2 components have also been linked to
more strategic processes like cognitive control (Folstein
& Van Petten, 2008; Ritter et al., 1979). Several studies
have found the anterior N2 to reflect response inhibition, with larger N2 amplitudes elicited by the inhibition
of a planned response during a go/no-go task (Bruin &
Wijers, 2002; Pfefferbaum et al., 1985; Jodo & Kayama,
1992; Falkensten et al., 1999), and correct responses to
incongruent noise conditions during the Eriksen Flanker
Task (Bartholow et al., 2005; Yeung et al., 2004). Importantly, evidence suggests that N2 increases elicited by
response inhibition during go/no-go tasks are modulated
by task difficulty, such that larger amplitudes are elicited
when participants are pressured to respond quickly (Jodo
& Kayama, 1992). Finally, research by Falkenstein et al.
(1999) and Kopp et al., (1996) found significant associations between N2 amplitude and successful response
inhibition during a go/no-go task, providing further evidence in support of the link between the N2 component
and cognitive control processes related to inhibition.
The visual N1, P2, and N2 components have also been
examined in the context of race processing among White
college students (Ito & Urland, 2003, 2005; Ito et al.,
2004). Research on N1 amplitudes during race processing
has been mixed. One study examining automatic attention allocation during a face encoding task found the N1
to be sensitive to race, such that Black faces elicited larger
amplitudes compared to White faces. This seems to suggest that participants showed greater automatic attention
allocation to Black faces compared to White faces (Ito
& Urland, 2003). However, this effect of race on the N1
component was not replicated during tasks where faces
were presented as task-irrelevant stimuli (Ito & Urland,
2005). One interpretation of these conflicting findings
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is that N1 amplitude sensitivity to race may depend on
whether race is a relevant cue or not for the task at hand.
Research on the P2 and race processing has been more
consistent, with larger amplitudes elicited by Black compared to White faces (Ito & Urland, 2003, 2005). The N2
component has also been shown to be sensitive to race,
with larger amplitudes elicited by White faces compared
to Black faces, both during passive viewing (Ito & Urland,
2003; Ito et al., 2004), and when presented as irrelevant
stimuli (Ito & Urland, 2003). Consistent with research
on sustained attention and inhibition processes outlined above, Ito et al. (2004, see also Ito & Urland, 2005)
interpret these findings to indicate greater activation of
sustained attentional processes, also referred to as vigilance by Ito & Urland (2005), in response to unfamiliar
racial out-group members (i.e., Black faces) compared
to familiar racial in-group members (i.e., White faces),
and greater activation of cognitive control processes
in response to racial in-group, compared to out-group,
members.
Researchers have also examined the visual N1, P2,
and N2 components during a shooter bias task (Correll
et al., 2006). While N1 amplitudes were only shown to
be differentially sensitive to objects (i.e., larger amplitudes in response to weapons vs. harmless objects), P2
and N2 amplitudes were both differentially sensitive
to objects (i.e., larger P2 and smaller N2 amplitude for
weapons vs. harmless objects) and the race of the target
(i.e., larger P2 and smaller N2 amplitude for Black compared to White men). One interpretation of these findings, consistent with the automatic attention allocation,
sustained attention, and inhibition frameworks outlined
above, is that participants automatically attended more to
weapons than harmless objects, were most vigilant during trials where Black men held weapons, and exerted the
most cognitive control on trials where White men held
harmless objects. Furthermore, these biases in race and
object processing were associated with racially biased
performance on the shooter bias task, such that greater
activation of attention, and less activation of inhibition
processes, in response to Black (vs. White) targets predicted more incorrect decisions to shoot unarmed Black
men compared to unarmed White men (Correll et al.,
2006).
While these findings were seminal in laying the
groundwork toward understanding the neurocognitive
mechanisms that contribute to racially biased responses
during a weapon identification task, they are not without
shortcomings. For example, in the research by Correll
et al. (2006), race processing during the shooter bias task
is confounded with object processing, due to the simultaneous presentation of both race and object stimuli during each trial of the task. Thus, it is unclear whether the
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race effects on P2 and N2 amplitudes, as well as the lack
of race effects on N1 amplitude, were purely in response
to racial cues, or whether they were driven by the simultaneous presentation of stereotypically congruent (e.g.,
Black men—guns) and incongruent (e.g., Black men—
harmless objects) race—object pairings.
This confound can be addressed by examining visual processing components like the N1, P2, and N2
within a sequential priming paradigm like the weapon
identification task that decouples responses to dangerous and harmless objects from responses to racial cues
like faces (Payne, 2001). To our knowledge, no published
study has investigated whether and how automatic shunting of selective attention and inhibition processes varies
as a function of racial cues to influence subsequent object
processing.
Neural processing of errors consistent with the weapon
bias effect

EEG techniques have also been used to examine ERPs
associated with error processing, specifically the ErrorRelated Negativity (ERN) and Error-Related Positivity
(Pe), during a weapon identification task. Both the ERN
and the Pe are believed to propagate from the anterior
cingulate cortex (ACC) (Herrmann et al., 2004), a neural
structure interconnected with both limbic and prefrontal areas of the brain, and functionally linked to the processing and regulation of motor, cognitive, and affective
information (Bush et al., 2000).
The ERN, a well-documented error processing component, is a negative-going evoked potential that peaks
50–100 ms after a response that is larger for incorrect vs.
correct responses (Yeung et al., 2004). Further, research
has found the amplitude of ERNs to incorrect responses
to be affected by the significance of errors (Hajcak et al.,
2005; Hajcak & Foti, 2008), with larger ERN amplitudes
typically associated with more costly errors. ERN amplitude has also been linked to motivation (Hajcak & Foti,
2008; Pailing & Segalowitz, 2004; Potts, 2011). For example, research by Potts (2011) examined ERN amplitudes
during a Flanker task where performance was linked to
monetary rewards. Results showed that ERN amplitudes
were largest after errors made during trials where incorrect responses resulted in monetary loss, suggesting that
ERN amplitudes were sensitive to participant’s motivations to maximize monetary gain.
The ERN has also been examined in association with
error processing during Payne’s weapon identification
task (Amodio et al., 2004, 2008). These studies found
that among individuals motivated to respond without
bias on the task, racially biased errors (e.g., misidentification of a harmless object following a Black prime)
elicit larger ERN amplitudes compared to non-biased
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errors (e.g., misidentification of a weapon following a
Black prime). Additionally, larger ERN amplitudes following racially biased errors predicted greater behavioral
accuracy on the weapon identification task. In line with
previous research on the ERN and motivation, Amodio
et al. (2008) found evidence to suggest that ERN amplitudes sensitivity to racially biased errors was modulated
by individual differences in participants’ motivation to
control prejudice. Specifically, racially biased errors elicited larger ERN amplitudes among individuals who indicated that they were highly, and personally, motivated
to control prejudice, compared to individuals who were
less personally motivated. Together, these findings suggest that automatic error detection processes (as indexed
by ERN amplitude following incorrect responses) play
an important role in weapon identification task performance, especially among individuals personally motivated to respond without prejudice. However, it is still
unclear how automatic recognition of racially biased
errors leads to better performance, as this would suggest
that some controlled processes must be activated to overcome automatic race and object processes that influence
task performance.
One component that may explain the link between
ERN and better task performance on the weapon
identification task is the Error-Related Positivity (Pe)
component. The Pe is related to but functionally distinct from the ERN (for a review see Overbeek et al.,
2005), and is associated with controlled error processing, and cognitive re-evaluation processes required for
response inhibition (Donchin et al., 1988; Herrmann
et al., 2004; Leuthold & Sommer, 1999). The Pe has
also been suggested to reflect conscious awareness of
errors during an antisaccade task (Nieuwenhuis et al.,
2001), such that larger Pe amplitudes were elicited by
perceived, compared to unperceived, errors. While
the Pe has not been examined within the context of
the weapon identification task, we suggest that Pe
amplitude may also be sensitive to errors consistent
with both threat superiority and weapon bias effects.
Given the documented links between the Pe, conscious awareness of errors, and cognitive re-evaluation
following errors on cognitive tasks, Pe sensitivity to
errors elicited by object or racial biases may indicate
the extent to which participants are aware that they are
making biased errors during the weapon identification
task, and reflect adaptation during the task through
controlled inhibition of biased responses. For this reason, we argue that examination of Pe, along with ERN,
within a weapon identification task is critical for furthering our understanding of how error processing can
impact cognitive control to improve weapon identification accuracy.
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The effects of anger on attention, inhibition, and error
recognition

Anger has been shown to strengthen the threat superiority effect, increasing vigilance to weapons and misidentification of harmless objects during a weapon detection
task (Baumann & Desteno, 2010). Anger has also been
shown to magnify implicit bias toward out-group members, presumably because of the association of anger with
intergroup conflict and competition (Dasgupta et al.,
2009; DeSteno et al., 2004). Such magnification of bias
may also be related to anger-induced increases in confidence (Clore et al., 2001), or anger-induced heuristic
processing when making social judgments (Bodenhausen
et al., 1994). For these reasons, one might predict that
anger would exacerbate errors consistent with threat
superiority and weapon bias effects on a weapon detection task by increasing attention and vigilance to Black
(compared to White) faces, and decreasing the recognition and inhibition of biased errors.
However, previous research by Unkelbach et al. (2008)
examined the effect of affect (i.e., anger, positive mood,
neutral mood) on racial bias during a shooter bias task
that used Muslim and White targets. Racially biased
responses (i.e., shooting unarmed Muslim targets) were
elicited among neutral and positive feeling participants.
Interestingly, angry participants did not show racially
biased responses; instead, they showed greater propensity to shoot all targets regardless of race compared to
positive or neutral participants. In other words, anger did
not increase racially biased responding during a shooter
bias task, which conflicts with the research summarized
earlier.
The lack of race bias effects on shooter bias task accuracy among angry participants in the work by Unkelbach
et al. (2008) may be partially explained by research showing that anger functions as a goal-oriented motivator,
that can positively impact cognitive performance by suppressing task-irrelevant information (Carver & HarmonJones, 2009; Harmon-Jones, 2019; Harmon-Jones et al.,
2003; Peterson et al., 2011; Harmon-Jones, 2004; Schmitt
et al., 2019). This explanation, however, fails to address
why angry participants were more likely to shoot all targets compared to neutral and happy participants. Thus,
a conceptual replication of these conflicting findings is
warranted, to distinguish between the two competing
hypotheses (H1, H2) stated above.
The current study

In the current study, we examine the effects of anger on
visual attention, inhibition, and error recognition processes during a sequential priming weapon identification
task, to better understand the neurocognitive mechanisms by which anger influences the threat superiority
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and weapon bias effects. To test our competing hypotheses, we examined the effect of anger on ERPs associated
with early attention allocation (N1), sustained attention
(i.e., vigilance; P2) and response inhibition (N2) during
race prime processing, as well as automatic error recognition (ERN) and subsequent controlled error recognition
and task re-evaluation processes (Pe) following threat
assessment, in a variation of Payne’s (2001) weapon identification task. Thus, this study examined neurocognitive
mechanisms across the entire time course of the weapon
identification task, from the moment that faces varying in
race appeared as primes, followed by harmless or threatening objects, followed by participants’ response.
We propose two competing sets of predictions. If anger
activates stereotypes as some research suggests (H1:
e.g., DeSteno et al., 2004; Dasgupta et al., 2009; Bodenhausen et al., 1994), we predict that angry (vs. neutral)
participants will show (1) greater threat superiority and
weapon bias effects as indexed by accuracy and response
time during the weapon identification task; (2) increased
attention to, and reduced inhibitory processing of, Black
compared to White faces, as indexed by larger N1 and P2
amplitudes and smaller N2 amplitudes; and (3) reduced
recognition and re-evaluation of errors after making
racially biased errors or misidentifying harmless objects
as weapons, as indexed by smaller ERN and Pe amplitudes. Alternatively, if anger motivates goal attainment
by focusing attentional and memory resources to taskrelevant stimuli, while simultaneously ignoring task-irrelevant stimuli (H2: e.g., Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009;
Harmon-Jones, 2004, 2019; Harmon-Jones et al., 2003;
Peterson et al., 2011; Schmitt et al., 2019; Unkelbach
et al., 2008), we predict (1) reduced threat superiority and
weapon bias effects as indexed by accuracy and response
time during the weapon identification task; (2) reduced
attention to, and increased inhibitory processing of, both
Black and White face primes, as indexed by smaller N1
and P2 amplitudes and larger N2 amplitudes; and (3)
increased recognition and re-evaluation of any type of
error, regardless of whether they are racially stereotypic
errors or misidentification of harmless objects as weapons, as indexed by larger ERN and Pe amplitudes.

Method
Participants

Data were collected from 131 University of Massachusetts Amherst students. Participants were all non-Black
[consistent with sampling methods used in Payne (2001)],
right-handed participants between the ages of 18 and 35.
All participants were screened for the use of psychoactive medication within the last six months. Of the 131
participants, data from 28 were excluded from analysis
for failing the emotion manipulation check. Behavioral
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data from the remaining 103 participants (93 White, 7
Asian, 3 Latino/Hispanic; 72 Female; 50 anger condition,
53 neutral condition) were included in the behavioral
analyses examining accuracy and response time during
the task. ERP data from 76 (35 anger condition, 41 neutral condition) of those 103 participants were included
in ERP analyses. ERP data from the remaining 27 participants were excluded from ERP analyses due to making fewer than 3 errors in at least one condition (which
is insufficient for calculating error-related ERPs; n = 13),
having more than 80% of responses be of one type (either
weapon or harmless objects) such that correctness was
more closely related to the correspondence between
object type and response bias than a decision made on
each trial (n = 10), or showing excessive artifacts in ERP
averages (n = 4).
Procedure

Upon entering the study, participants were randomly
assigned to either the anger or neutral emotion condition, and were led to believe they would be participating in two unrelated tasks: a decision-making task (i.e.,
the weapon identification task) and an autobiographical
memory task (i.e., the emotion induction task). Participants in both conditions first completed a practice version of the weapon identification task. Next, participants
were asked to engage in an alleged autobiographical writing task, which was actually designed to induce an angry
or neutral emotional state. This emotion induction task
consisted of two separate 5-min writing blocks during
which participants wrote about a time in their life when
they were very angry (anger condition), or a description
of their apartment or dorm room layout (neutral condition). After writing for 5 min, participants were asked to
complete block 1 of the weapon identification task. They
then returned to the emotion induction task and continued writing where they had left off for another 5 min.
After the second writing period, participants completed
block 2 of the weapon identification task. After completing block 2, participants completed a self-report measure
of their emotional state while they were engaged in the
autobiographical writing task and provided demographic
information. Finally, participants were debriefed regarding the true nature of the study, and given the option to
watch a short positive film to counteract lingering negative emotions.
Weapon identification task

The weapon identification task used in the current study
was adapted from Payne’s weapon identification task
(2001), with modifications to better control for stimulus factors and make the task more difficult (Fig. 1). We
created a more difficult version of the original task to
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Fig. 1 Example trial from the weapon identification task used in the current study, adapted from Payne (2001)

ensure participants would make enough errors to reveal
a reliable ERN. Prior to starting the task, participants
were told that “several images, including patterns, faces,
and objects, would be flashed on screen”. Participants
were further instructed to “focus on the objects, and to
quickly press one of two buttons to categorize the object
as either harmless, or a weapon”. The association between
the two buttons (one corresponding to their left hand
and the other to their right) and the two categories (i.e.,
weapon or harmless object) were counterbalanced across
participants.
Each trial started with a pattern mask (white noise) displayed on a computer monitor for 1000 ms. Next, either
a Black or a White face displayed for 200 ms. Following the face prime, a gray square was presented on the
screen for 20 ms followed by either a weapon or a harmless object for another 200 ms. Following the object, the
pattern mask was displayed for another 650 ms, during
which a button press was made to indicate whether the
object was a weapon or a harmless object (response window). Finally, there was a blank screen of 300 ms after
the response window (intertrial interval). Participant
responses that were made either in the response window
or the intertrial interval were recorded and included in
analysis. If participants responded during the intertrial
interval, or if they failed to respond at all, they received
the following onscreen visual warning for 1000 ms in
white text on a black background: “You did not respond
fast enough on that trial. Remember to respond as
quickly as possible!”.
To increase the difficulty of our weapon identification
task compared to that of Payne (2001), we used a larger
set of faces and objects and more closely matched the
weapons and harmless objects (see “Appendix”). Specifically, we included 12 faces (6 Black faces, 6 White
faces), 30 weapons (6 handguns, 6 assault rifles, 6 knifes,

6 bombs, 6 pairs of nunchucks), and 30 harmless objects
(6 L-shaped pipes, 6 windshield ice scrapers, 6 pens, 6
bundles of firewood, 6 pairs of candles). The faces were
identical to those used in previous studies of implicit
bias (Nosek et al., 2007). The object images were initially
found through a Google Images search and then modified for this study. Unlike the original weapon identification task, we qualitatively matched each weapon image
to a harmless object image by shape, orientation, and
brightness. Thus, participants were less able to rely on
simple visual features to differentiate between weapons
and harmless objects. We included a gray square between
the face and the object on each trial so that any similarities in basic visual features between a category of faces
(Black, White) and a category of objects (weapons, harmless objects) would be less likely to affect responses. An
example weapon identification trial can be seen in Fig. 1.
Each block of the weapon identification task consisted of
240 trials, with 60 trials for each Race Prime (Black vs.
White) × Object Type (weapon vs. harmless) combination. The order in which trials were presented was randomized for each block, and across all participants.
Emotion induction and manipulation check

The emotion induction for participants in the anger
group, and the control task for participants in the neutral group, was disguised as an autobiographical writing
task and has been used in several studies to successfully
induce specific emotions in participants (Dasgupta et al.,
2009; DeSteno et al., 2004; Mills & D’Mello, 2014). In the
current study, participants in the anger condition were
given the following prompt: “Please take a moment to
remember a time that you were Very Angry. When you
have recalled this memory, focus on it so that you have
a vivid impression of the events involved. Take a minute to experience the feelings that you felt at that time.

Rivera‑Rodriguez et al. Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications

Once you have done this, please describe the memory
in as much detail as you can.” Participants in the neutral
condition were given the following prompt: “Please take a
moment to remember your Dorm Room or Apartment.
When you have recalled this memory, focus on it so that
you have a vivid picture of the room(s). Once you have
done this, please describe your room(s) in as much detail
as you possibly can.”.
At the end of the study, participants completed a selfreport measure of their emotional state while engaged in
the autobiographical writing task. Participants rated how
angry, calm, afraid, sad, mad, relaxed, disgusted, irritated,
scared, fearful, peaceful, and happy they felt on 7-point
Likert scales (1 = Not at all, 7 = Very Much). Ratings for
angry, mad, and irritated items were averaged to create
a composite anger index (Chronbach’s alpha = 0.97). Ratings of calm, relaxed, peaceful were averaged to create a
composite neutral index (Chronbach’s alpha = 0.97). We
also created a composite fear rating by averaging across
afraid, scared, fearful ratings (Chronbach’s alpha = 0.94).
Happiness, sadness, and disgust remained single items.
EEG was recorded with 128-Channel HydroCel™ Geodesic Sensor Nets (EGI, Eugene OR). Electrodes were
soaked in a water and potassium chloride solution to
maintain impedances below 60 kΩs. Data were initially recorded with a 250 Hz sampling rate, a bandpass
of 0.01–100 Hz, and referenced to the central-midline
electrode (Cz in 10/20 system). The 128 electrode locations included sites directly above and below both eyes
to detect blinks and vertical eye movements, and at the
outer canthi of each eye to detect horizontal eye movements. All data were re-referenced offline to the average
of the left and right mastoid recordings.
Individual subject data were processed using EEGLAB
(Delorme & Makeig, 2004) and ERPLAB (Lopez-Calderon & Luck, 2014) toolboxes in MATLAB. We first
applied a 60 Hz Parks-McClellan notch filter. Independent Component Analysis (ICA) was applied to continuous EEG data to remove artifacts related to blinks where
possible. In participants with a 1st ICA component that
was consistent with the timing and topography of blinks,
this component was excluded before all other components were recombined, and a high pass filter of 0.1 Hz
was applied. Prime-locked epochs were extracted from
continuous EEG 100 ms before to 500 ms after the
onset of the race prime. Response-locked epochs were
extracted from continuous EEG 100 ms before to 500 ms
after correct and incorrect responses. Epochs with
remaining blink or other artifacts were rejected using a
combination of algorithms and manual rejection. Primelocked epochs were averaged separately by participant
EEG data acquisition and processing
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for each electrode and Race (Black, White) by Object
(weapon, harmless) condition, and baseline corrected
to the average amplitude during the 100 ms before race
prime onset. Response-locked epochs were averaged
separately by participant for each electrode and Race by
Object by Correctness (incorrect, correct) condition, and
baseline corrected to the average amplitude during the
100 ms before the response.
ERP analysis

For both the prime-locked and response-locked ERPs,
data from 84 electrodes were included in analyses. To
treat topographic distribution as a two-dimensional construct, data from 7 proximal electrodes were averaged
together within each of 12 scalp regions, organized as a
3 (lateral) by 4 (anterior-to-posterior position) grid (see
Fig. 4 for details).
Prime‑locked ERPs

Mean amplitude measurements were made in three time
windows selected based on visual waveform inspection,
time-locked to the onset of the race prime. Early measurements captured the waveforms during presentation of
a race prime (N1: 100–150 ms), and as a race prime was
replaced by a gray square (P2: 150–225 ms), and then an
object (N2: 225–300 ms). Omnibus ANOVAs on mean
amplitude in these time windows included the betweensubjects factor Emotion (anger, neutral), and within-subjects factors Race prime (Black, White), lateral electrode
position (LMR: left, medial, right) and anterior-to-posterior electrode position (ACP: anterior, anterior-central,
posterior-central, posterior).1
Response‑locked ERPs

Mean amplitude measurements were made in three time
windows selected based on visual waveform inspection
for response-locked ERPs. Measurements captured the
waveforms immediately after a response in the typical
Error-Related Negativity (ERN) window (25–75 ms), in
a late ERN window (75–125 ms),2 and in a 300–400 ms
time window that captured the error-related positivity
(Pe). Omnibus ANOVAs conducted separately on mean
amplitude in each time window included the betweensubjects factor Emotion (anger, neutral), and within-subjects factors Race prime (Black, White), Object (weapon,
harmless), Correctness (correct, incorrect), lateral

1

For all ANOVAs, Greenhouse–Geisser corrected results are presented
whenever Mauchly’s Test for Sphericity indicated the assumption of sphericity
was violated.

2

ERN results are presented for the 25–75 ms time window only. Results
were the same in the 75–125 ms time window but are not reported for
brevity.
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Table 1 Sensitivity analyses: smallest detectable effect size based on analysis parameters
N

Betweensubjects
groups

Within-subject
measurements

Power

α

Lowest observed
Effect size
pairwise correlation

103

2

2

.80

.05

NA

.28

Main Effect of Emotion

103

2

2

.80

.05

.23

.21

Main Effect of for within-subject variables

103

2

2

.80

.05

.23

.17

Between-Subject × Within-Subject Interactions

103

2

2

.80

.05

.23

.17

76

2

2

.80

.05

NA

.32

Behavioral analyses
Paired-sample t tests
Mixed Method (Between-Within) ANOVA

ERP analyses

Paired-sample t tests
Mixed Method (Between-Within) ANOVA
Main Effect of Emotion

76

2

2

.80

.05

.23

.25

Main Effect of for Within-Subject Variables

76

2

2

.80

.05

.23

.20

Between-Subject × Within-Subject Interactions

76

2

2

.80

.05

.23

.20

Sensitivity analyses are reported for paired-sample t tests and mixed method ANOVAs, separately for behavioral and ERP analyses. We used the lowest observed
pairwise relationship among within-subject factors to obtain conservative estimates of the lowest effect size our analyses would be able to detect. Effect sizes for t test
are reported in Cohen’s d, effect sizes for ANOVAs are reported in Cohen’s f

electrode position (LMR), and anterior-to-posterior electrode position (ACP). Significant interactions of Correctness and electrode position factors were followed up by
ANOVAs on data from electrode regions where the effect
of Correctness was largest, to test hypotheses concerning the relationship between Emotion and Race prime in
making and evaluating rapid weapon-or-harmless-object
decisions.

Results
Sample size justification and sensitivity analysis

Previous research found effects of race on N1, P2, N2
(Correll et al., 2006; Ito and Urland, 2003, 2005; Ito et al.
2004), and ERN (Amodio et al., 2004, 2008) with sample
sizes as small as 16 and as large as 73. Across these studies, the average sample size was 37.7. Because our study
includes a between-subjects’ factor (i.e., Emotion), we
aimed to obtain a sample size that was at least twice as
large as this average (behavioral analysis: N = 103; ERP
analysis: N = 76).
We also conducted a sensitivity analysis using
G*Power 3.1 (Faul et al, 2007) to calculate the smallest
effect size we could detect for the two types of analyses
(t tests and mixed method ANOVAs) reported in this
study. Effect sizes were calculated based on sample size
(behavioral analysis: N = 103; ERP analysis: N = 76),
power (0.80), an alpha of 0.05, between-subject levels
(2), within-subject levels (2), and the lowest observed
pairwise correlation among our within-subject factors
(0.23). Note that we did not include electrode positions
factors (LMR, ACP) in our sensitivity analyses because

these factors were not central to our hypothesis. Results
from these analyses are presented in Table 1.
Emotion manipulation check

A qualitative analysis of written responses to the emotion induction prompts indicated that all participants
followed the writing prompt instructions. To ensure
that the difference in participants’ emotional state
between the two conditions was primarily due to
anger and not mixed emotions, we ensured that selfreported emotions from participants in the anger condition had an anger composite rating that was at least
1 point higher than other emotion ratings. Similarly,
we ensured that participants in the neutral condition
had composite calm ratings that were at least 1 point
greater than other emotion ratings. Data from participants who did not meet these criteria (n = 28) were
excluded from further analysis.
As expected, independent sample t tests showed that
participants in the anger condition reported feeling
angrier (M = 5.28, SD = 1.09) during the weapon identification task than participants in the neutral condition
(M = 1.34, SD = 1.04; t(101) = 18.81, p < 0.001). Conversely, participants in the neutral condition reported
feeling more calm (M = 6.06, SD = 0.91) during the
weapon identification task than participants in the
anger condition (M = 2.24, SD = 1.21; t(101) = − 18.26,
p < 0.001). Descriptive means for self-reported emotions (i.e., composite anger, composite calm, happy, sad,
disgust, and composite fear) are reported separately by
emotion condition in Table 2.
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Table 2 Mean self-reported emotions, separately by emotion
condition
Emotions

Condition
Anger

Neutral

(2021) 6:74

Page 11 of 27

did not have interactive effects on accuracy or weapon
bias (Emotion × Race: F(1, 101) = 0.018, p = 0.829,
d = 0.004; Emotion × Race × Object: F(1, 101) = 0.02,
p = 0.888, d = 0.004). In other words, neither the race of
face primes nor the induction of anger magnified weapon
bias. Average numbers of errors across Emotion condition, Race and Object type are displayed in Fig. 2.

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Anger

5.28

1.09

1.34

1.04

Calm

2.24

1.21

6.06

0.91

Happy

1.39

0.67

5.00

1.39

Response latency

Sad

3.51

1.93

1.58

1.06

Disgusted

3.84

1.89

1.23

0.82

Fearful

1.68

1.17

1.08

0.27

A
mixed
four-way
ANOVA
(Emotion × Race × Object × Correctness) was conducted on
log transformed response times (log RT), though means
are reported here as raw RTs for ease of understanding.
Consistent with past work (Dijksterhuis & Aarts, 2003;
Pratto & John, 1991; Wentura et al., 2000; Williams et al.,
1996), correct responses took longer than incorrect
responses (main effect of Correctness: F(1, 99) = 129.724,
p < 0.001, d = 0.29). A significant main effect of Object
was also found (F(1, 99) = 69.52, p < 0.001, d = 0.13), such
that participants were slower to react to harmless objects
(M = 418.23, SE = 1.43) than weapons (M = 402.18,
SE = 1.33). These main effects were qualified by a significant Object × Correctness interaction (F(1, 99) = 4.13,
p = 0.045, d = 0.18). Follow-up analyses indicated that
RTs were consistent with the threat superiority effect,
such that participants were significantly slower to correctly identify harmless objects (M = 449.62, SE = 2.08)
than weapons (M = 404.39, SE = 1.51; t(201) = 4.57,
p < 0.001, d = 0.32). On incorrect trials, participants
were on average faster to misidentify harmless objects
as weapons (M = 386.84, SE = 1.73) than to misidentify
weapons as harmless objects (M = 399.97, SE = 2.19),
though this difference in RT did not reach significance
(t(201) = − 0.64, p = 0.52, d = − 0.05).

Mean self-reported emotion scores and standard deviations (SD) reported
separately by emotion condition. Anger, calm and fearful emotions are
composite scores

Behavioral results
Response accuracy

A mixed three-way ANOVA (Emotion × Race × Object)
was conducted on the number of errors made on the
weapon identification task. Consistent with the threat
superiority effect, participants were more likely to misidentify harmless objects (Merrors = 23.56, SE = 1.14)
than weapons (Merrors = 13.92, SE = 0.93; main effect of
Object: F(1, 101) = 34.45, p < 0.001, d = 0.90), suggesting a significant weapon bias. However, unlike previous
research, there was no evidence that the race of primes
affected accuracy (main effect of Race: F(1, 101) = 0.002,
p = 0.967, d < 0.01) or weapon bias (Race × Object: F(1,
101) = 0.329, p = 0.567, d = 0.02). Likewise, anger did not
affect accuracy (main effect of Emotion: F(1, 101) = 1.85,
p = 0.177, d = 0.07) or weapon bias (Emotion × Object:
F(1, 99) = 2.67, p = 0.106, d = 0.29), and emotion and race

Fig. 2 Boxplots detailing the number of errors as a function of object type, both averaged across emotion condition and race prime (left) and
plotted separately by emotion condition and race prime (right)
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Fig. 3 Boxplots detailing raw RTs as a function of response correctness, averaged across both emotion condition and object type (top left),
separately by object type (top right), and separately by emotion condition and object type (bottom)

Emotion also influenced response time (main effect
of Emotion: F(1, 99) = 4.195, p = 0.043, d = 0.36), such
that participants in the anger condition were slower
to respond (M = 425.47, SE = 11.29) than those in the
neutral condition (M = 395.82, SE = 10.96). This main
effect of emotion was qualified by a significant Emotion × Object × Correctness interaction (F(1, 99) = 4.39,
p = 0.039, d = 0.19). Follow-up analyses disaggregating this interaction by Emotion revealed a significant
Object × Accuracy interaction in the anger condition
(F(1, 48) = 55.55, p < 0.001, d = 0.55), but not the neutral condition (F(1, 51) = 1.13, p = 0.973, d < 0.01). Specifically, in the anger condition, participants were
significantly slower to correctly identify harmless objects
(M = 473.69, SE = 2.02) than to correctly identify weapons (M = 410.21, SE = 1.83; t(97) = 13.75, p < 0.001,
d = 1.37). Participants in the anger condition were
also faster to misidentify harmless objects as weapons
(M = 395.73, SE = 2.38) than to misidentify weapons as
harmless objects (M = 422.25, SE = 2.78), (t(97) = 13.75,
p < 0.001, d = − 0.42).
Similar to response accuracy, and contrary to our
hypotheses, race had no effect on response times (main
effect of Race: F(1, 99) = 0.06, p = 0.800, d < 0.01; all

interactions involving race, p > 0.25, statistics reported in
supplemental information3). Average RTs as a function of
emotion condition, object type, and correctness are displayed in Fig. 3.
Neural responses to race primes during the weapon
identification task (prime‑locked ERPs)

To examine whether anger and race influenced the visual
processing of race primes, a four-way omnibus ANOVA
(Emotion × Race × LMR × ACP) was run separately for
N1, P2, and N2 components as dependent variables. In
cases where the omnibus ANOVA yielded significant
interactions between electrode position factors (i.e.,
LMR: left, medial, right; ACP: anterior, anterior-central,
posterior-central, posterior) and factors central to our
hypotheses (i.e., Emotion, Race), follow-up analyses were
conducted over scalp regions where the effects of emotion and/or race were largest. Prime-locked ERP waveforms depicting the effect of emotion and race of prime
on N1, P2, and N2 amplitudes can be found in Fig. 4.

3

Supplemental information can be download with the following OSF link:
https://osf.io/dqxtw/?view_only=45d1f1968dd9420c9a084e5212219412.
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Fig. 4 ERP waveforms time-locked to the onset of the race prime. The timing of the ERP measurement windows (N1: 100–150 ms, P2: 150–225 ms,
and N2: 225–300 ms) and appearance of the race prime (0–200 ms) and object (220–420 ms) are shown on the scale. Emotion condition is
distinguished by line thickness (anger = thicker, neutral = thinner); Race prime is distinguished by line shading (Black = darker, White = lighter).
Faces elicited a larger N1 in the anger condition than in the neutral condition. In the neutral emotion condition only, Black faces elicited a larger P2
than White faces over anterior and anterior-central regions. In the neutral condition, White faces elicited a larger N2 than Black faces over medial
and right anterior regions. Effect significance over each scalp region is indicated with a filled rectangle
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Table 3 Mean N1 amplitude by Emotion
Anger
Mean

Neutral
SD

Mean

SD

Mid
Anterior
Anterior-central
Right
Anterior
Anterior-central

− 2.77

− 2.47
− 1.81

− 1.29

1.87
2.14
2.09
1.64

− 1.95

− 1.54
− 1.66

− 1.05

1.87
1.85
1.59
1.55

Mean N1 amplitudes and standard deviations (SD) reported separately by
Emotion, across electrode positions where the effect of Race was significant:
medial, anterior, medial anterior-central, right anterior, and right anterior-central

N1 (100–150 ms)

To examine whether anger and race influenced N1
amplitude, a four-way Omnibus ANOVA (Emotion × Race × LMR × ACP) was run on mean ERP amplitudes 100–150 ms after race prime onset. Race primes
elicited a larger N1 in the anger condition (M = − 1.00,
SE = 0.02) than in the neutral condition (M = − 0.59,
SE = 0.02; main effect of Emotion: F(1, 74) = 5.74,
p = 0.019, d = 0.29). Although the effect of Emotion was
evident across multiple electrode regions (as shown in
Fig. 4), a significant Emotion × LMR × ACP interaction
(F(6, 444) = 3.47, p = 0.016, d = 0.20) suggested that the
strength of the Emotion effect on N1 amplitude differed
across electrode positions. Follow-up analyses disaggregated this interaction by laterality (LMR electrode
regions) and found significant Emotion × ACP interactions at medial (F(3, 222) = 3.81, p = 0.011, d = 0.35)
and right (F(3, 222) = 5.03, p = 0.012, d = 0.35) regions.
The N1 effect at the left region was nonsignificant
(F(3, 222) = 2.10, p = 0.131, d = 0.20). Significant Emotion × ACP interactions at medial and right lateralization were further broken down by anterior-to-posterior
electrode position. At the medial region, a significant
effect of Emotion was found at anterior (t(294) = − 3.82,
p < 0.001, d = − 0.44) and anterior-central regions
(t(276) = − 3.99, p < 0.001, d = − 0.46). At the right region,
a significant effect of Emotion was also found at anterior
(t(262) = − 2.40, p = 0.017, d = − 0.28) and anterior-central (t(292) = − 3.33, p < 0.001, d = − 0.38) regions. While
the effect of Emotion on N1 amplitude was significant
anteriorly (anterior and anterior-central) at both medial
and right lateralization, effect sizes suggest that the
effect of emotion was strongest at medial (as compared
to right) regions of the scalp (Fig. 4, earliest marked time
window). Mean N1 amplitudes by Emotion condition at
medial anterior, medial anterior-central, right anterior,
and right-anterior-central are reported in Table 3.
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Because we were interested in whether the effect
of Emotion on N1 amplitude was influenced by Race,
we conducted an additional targeted Emotion × Race
ANOVA over medial anterior and medial anterior-central regions where the Emotion effect sizes were largest.
This analysis did not yield any evidence to suggest that
N1 amplitude, or the effect of Emotion on N1 amplitude,
was moderated by Race at either medial anterior (main
effect of Race: F(1, 74) = 0.11, p = 0.739, d = 0.04; Emotion × Race: F(1, 74) = 1.19, p = 0.278, d = 0.11), or medial
anterior-central (main effect of Race: F(1, 74) = 0.00,
p = 0.968, d < 0.01; Emotion × Race: F(1, 74) = 0.09,
p = 0.754, d = 0.04) regions.
P2 (150–225 ms)

To examine whether anger and race influenced P2
amplitude, a four-way omnibus ANOVA (Emotion × Race × LMR × ACP) was run on mean amplitude
150–225 ms after race prime onset. Marginal interactions
between electrode factors and both Emotion and Race
(Emotion × ACP: F(3, 222) = 2.84, p = 0.077, d = 0.17;
Race × ACP: F(3, 222) = 2.99, p = 0.054, d = 0.48; Emotion × Race × LMR: F(1, 148) = 3.13, p = 0.057, d = 0.47)
suggested the possibility of Emotion and Race effects
at specific scalp locations. Given that Emotion × Race
effects were predicted a priori, this motivated us to run
follow-up three-way ANOVAs (Race × LMR × ACP) separately by emotion.
In the anger condition, Race did not affect P2 amplitude (Race × LMR × ACP: F(6, 204) = 1.23, p = 0.299,
d = 0.04; Race × LMR: F(2, 68) = 2.93, p = 0.066, d = 0.05;
Race × ACP: F(3, 102) = 0.28, p = 0.718, d = 0.03). However, in the neutral condition, a significant Race × ACP
interaction (F(3, 120) = 4.40, p = 0.031, d = 0.11) suggested that P2 amplitude differed as a function of race at
specific anterior-to-posterior electrode positions (Fig. 4).
Disaggregating this interaction by ACP yielded significant effects of race over anterior (t(245) = 3.90, p < 0.001,
d = 0.25), anterior-central (t(245) = 3.24, p = 0.001,
d = 0.21), and posterior-central (t(245) = 2.07, p = 0.040,
d = 0.13) regions, such that larger P2 amplitudes were
elicited by Black (compared to White) faces. The effect of
race was not significant at posterior regions of the scalp
(t(245) = − 0.72, p = 0.470, d = − 0.05). In sum, these
results suggest that P2 amplitudes were sensitive to race
primes among participants who were emotionally neutral, but not among participants who were induced to feel
angry. Mean P2 amplitudes for both anger and neutral
conditions at anterior, anterior-central, and posteriorcentral regions are reported in Table 4 and shown in
Fig. 4 (second marked time window).
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Table 4 Mean P2 amplitude by Emotion and Race
Anger

Neutral

Black

White

Black

White

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Anterior

0.97

3.46

0.40

2.73

2.14

2.49

1.63

2.19

Anterior-central

1.21

4.02

1.18

3.10

2.40

2.66

2.01

2.34

Posterior-central

0.81

3.67

0.86

2.94

1.65

2.36

1.43

2.18

Mean P2 amplitudes and standard deviations (SD) reported separately by Emotion and Race at anterior, anterior-central and posterior-central regions. Bold numbers
represent descriptive statistics for significant effects of Race, italicized numbers represent descriptive statistics for non-significant effects of Race

Table 5 Mean N2 amplitude by Emotion and Race
Anger

Neutral

Black
Mean

White
SD

Mean

Black
SD

Mean

White
SD

Mean

SD

Left
Anterior
Anterior-central
Posterior-central
Mid
Anterior
Anterior-central
Right

− 2.11

− 3.35

− 1.71
− 2.89

− 3.36

3.10
3.71
3.51
3.78
3.84

− 1.98

− 2.81

− 1.82
− 3.50

− 3.89

2.59

− 1.14

2.97

− 1.81

3.18

3.07

− 1.29

3.09

− 2.12

2.93

2.48

− 0.67

2.64

− 1.21

2.29

3.48

− 1.58

3.93

− 2.61

4.13

3.75

− 2.06

4.06

− 2.95

3.8

2.67

− 0.64

3.01

− 1.24

3.14

Anterior-central

− 1.72

3.02

− 2.44

2.93

− 1.05

3.31

− 1.68

3.14

Posterior-central

− 0.64

2.64

− 1.33

2.79

− 0.32

2.37

−0 .62

2.17

Anterior

− 1.45

2.53

− 1.73

Mean N2 amplitudes and standard deviations (SD) reported separately by Emotion and Race, across electrode positions: left, medial, right (LMR) and anterior, anteriorcentral, and posterior-central regions. Bold numbers represent descriptive statistics for significant effects of Race, italicized numbers represent descriptive statistics for
non-significant effects of race

N2 (225–300 ms)

To examine whether anger and race influenced N2
amplitude, a four-way omnibus ANOVA (Emotion × Race × LMR × ACP) was run on mean EEG amplitude 225–300 ms after race prime. A main effect of Race
indicated smaller N2 amplitudes in response to Black,
compared to White, face primes (main effect of Race:
F(1, 74) = 5.94, p = 0.017, d = 0.14) (see Fig. 4). Significant interactions among Race, Emotion, and electrode
factors (Race × ACP: F(3, 222) = 14.24, p < 0.001, d < 0.01;
Race × LMR × ACP: F(6, 444) = 5.69, p < 0.001, d = 0.05;
Emotion × Race × LMR: F(2, 148) = 4.02, p = 0.028,
d = 0.05) suggested that the effects of Race and Emotion on N2 amplitude differed across scalp location.
This motivated us to run follow-up four-way ANOVAs
(Race × LMR × ACP) separately by emotion.
In the anger condition, a significant Race × LMR × ACP
interaction (F(6, 204) = 2.72, p = 0.014, d = 0.06) suggested that the effect of Race on N2 amplitude varied

across scalp locations. Follow-up analyses separated by
LMR regions revealed significant Race × ACP interactions at medial (F(3, 102) = 4.87, p = 0.012, d = 0.11) and
right regions (F(3, 102) = 5.07, p = 0.009, d = 0.13) only;
no effect was evident in the left region (F(3, 102) = 0.98,
p = 0.404, d = 0.05). Within each ACP region, the effect
of Race was significant over right anterior-central scalp
regions (t(69) = 2.00, p = 0.049, d = 0.24), and marginally significant at right posterior-central scalp regions
(t(69) = 1.83, p = 0.071, d = 0.22) only. The effect of Race
was not significant over right anterior, right posterior,
and any medial scalp regions (ps > 0.10). In sum, among
participants induced to feel angry, Black faces elicited
smaller N2 amplitudes than White faces over a constrained region of right central scalp (see Table 5).
In
the
Neutral
condition,
a
significant
Race × LMR × ACP interaction also suggested that the
effect of Race on N2 amplitude varied across scalp locations (F(6, 240) = 3.83, p = 0.004, d = 0.03). Follow-up

Rivera‑Rodriguez et al. Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications

analyses revealed significant Race × ACP interactions
at left (F(3, 120) = 7.94, p = 0.002, d = 0.13), medial
(F(3, 120) = 13.50, p < 0.001, d = 0.16), and right (F(3,
120) = 10.76, p < 0.001, d = 0.13) regions of the scalp.
Looking along the anterior-to-posterior axis over left
scalp regions yielded significant effects of Race over anterior (t(81) = 2.68, p = 0.008, d = 0.30), anterior-central
(t(81) = 3.83, p < 0.001, d = 0.42) and posterior-central
(t(81) = 2.71, p = 0.008, d = 0.30) regions. Over medial
scalp regions, significant effects of Race were found at
anterior (t(81) = 3.86, p < 0.001, d = 0.43) and anteriorcentral (t(81) = 3.37, p = 0.002, d = 0.37) regions, but not
posterior-central or posterior regions (ps < 0.10). Finally,
over right scalp regions, significant effects of Race were
found at anterior (t(81) = 2.84, p = 0.006, d = 0.31) and
anterior-central regions (t(81) = 3.12, p = 0.002, d = 0.35),
but not at posterior-central or posterior regions (ps <
.10). In sum, while Black (compared to White) faces elicited smaller N2 amplitudes participants in both the anger
and neutral conditions, this effect of race was much more
broadly distributed over the scalp in participants induced
to feel neutral. Mean N2 amplitudes for both anger
and neutral conditions at all significant electrode locations are reported in Table 5, and shown in Fig. 4 (latest
marked time window).
Neural processing of errors during the weapon
identification task (response‑locked ERPs)
Error‑related negativity (ERN)

A six-way omnibus ANOVA (Emotion × Race × Object ×
Correctness × LMR × ACP) was run on mean ERP amplitudes 25–75 ms after participants’ responses on the
weapon identification task to test for automatic error processing. Consistent with past studies on the ERN (Amodio et al., 2004, 2008), incorrect responses elicited a larger
negativity than correct responses (main effect of Correctness: F(1, 74) = 57.57, p < 0.001, d = 0.48) (see Fig. 5).
Although the Correctness effect was evident across the
entire scalp, a significant Correctness × LMR × ACP
interaction (F(6, 444) = 26.34, p < 0.001, d = 0.09) suggested that the strength of the ERN effect differed across
electrode positions. Follow-up analyses disaggregated
the interaction by anterior-to-posterior scalp regions
and found significant Correctness × LMR interactions at
anterior (F(2, 150) = 35.44, p < 0.001, d = 0.29), anteriorcentral (F(2, 150) = 31.35, p < 0.001, d = 0.23), and posterior-central (F(2, 150) = 7.05, p = 0.001, d = 0.11) regions.
The Correctness × LMR interactions were followed up
by testing for simple effects of Correctness at each scalp
location (see Table 6 and Fig. 6).
Consistent with past literatures on the ERN, the effect
of Correctness was largest over medial anterior-central
regions (t(303) = 11.84, p < 0.001, d = 0.68; difference in
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ERN amplitude: Incorrect − Correct = − 2.74). Because
we were interested in whether ERN amplitude sensitivity to errors differed as a function of Emotion, Race,
or Object, we conducted a four-way ANOVA (Emotion × Race × Object x Correctness) at the medial anterior-central region where Correctness effect sizes were
largest. This analysis did not yield any evidence to suggest that the ERN at medial anterior-central regions was
moderated by Race, Object, Emotion, or any interactions
among these variables (all interactions involving Correctness × Race, Correctness × Object, Correctness × Emotion
and
Emotion × Race × Object × Correctness,
p > 0.50, statistics reported in supplemental information).
Response-locked ERP waveforms depicting the effects
of Emotion, Race, Object, and Correctness on the ERN
measured over medial anterior-central regions can be
seen in Fig. 5.
Error‑related positivity (Pe)

A six-way omnibus ANOVA (Emotion × Race × Object ×
Correctness × LMR × ACP) was run on mean ERP amplitude 300–400 ms after participants made a response to
test for controlled error processing during the weapon
identification task. Consistent with existing literature
on the Pe (Donchin et al., 1988; Herrmann et al., 2004;
Leuthold & Sommer, 1999), a main effect of Correctness reflected larger Pe amplitudes following incorrect,
compared to correct, responses (main effect of Correctness: F(1, 74) = 9.62, p = 0.003, d = .19) (see Fig. 6). A
significant Object × Correctness × LMR × ACP interaction (F(6, 444) = 3.37, p = 0.028, d = .02) suggested that
the effect of Correctness differed by object type across
electrode positions. Follow-up analysis disaggregated
the interaction by object type and found significant Correctness × LMR × ACP interactions for both harmless
objects (F(6, 444) = 3.22, p = 0.004, d = .03) and weapons (F(6, 444) = 3.64, p = 0.004, d = .05), which indicated
that the effect of Correctness was generally more posteriorly distributed for weapons than for harmless objects
(as shown in Fig. 6), and was medially weighted overall but had increasingly broad lateral distribution with
increasingly centroposteriority. This three-way interaction was further disaggregated by anterior-to-posterior
scalp regions. For harmless objects, significant Correctness × LMR interactions were found at anterior (F(2,
148) = 6.64, p = 0.004, d = 0.06), anterior-central (F(2,
148) = 7.07, p = 0.001, d = 0.06), and posterior-central
(F(2, 148) = 5.34, p = 0.006, d = 0.09) regions. For weapons, significant Correctness × LMR interactions were
found at anterior-central (F(2, 148) = 5.01, p = 0.007,
d = 0.06), posterior-central (F(2, 148) = 23.3, p < 0.001,
d = 0.19), and posterior regions (F(2, 148) = 6.10,
p = 0.004, d = 0.09). Significant Correctness × LMR
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Fig. 5 ERP waveforms time-locked to a response at medial anterior-central electrodes only. Correctness is distinguished by line color
(incorrect = red, correct = green); Emotion condition is distinguished by line thickness (anger = thicker, neutral = thinner); Race prime is
distinguished by line shading (Black = darker, White = lighter); Object type is distinguished by line type (weapon = solid, harmless = dashed). Solid
black lines show waveforms averaged across all Correct conditions and all incorrect conditions. Incorrect responses elicited a larger negativity
than correct responses in the ERN time window (25–75 ms after response) that carried over into the subsequent time window (75–125 ms after
response), with no evidence of modulation by Emotion, Race prime, or Object type

Table 6 Simple effects of correctness on ERN amplitude, as a function of electrode position
Left
t(303)
Anterior
Anterior-central
Posterior-central

− 1.95†

Mid
Effect size
− .11

t(303)

Right
Effect size

t(303)
− 1.21

Effect size

3.89**

.22

9.29**

.53

11.84**

.68

10.47**

.60

− .07

8.65**

.49

10.72**

.62

10.68**

.61

Paired sample t tests reporting significance and effect size (Cohen’s d) of Correctness effects on ERN amplitudes across electrode positions: left, medial, right (LMR)
and anterior-to-posterior (ACP)
*p < .05; **p < .001; †p < .10
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Fig. 6 ERP waveforms time-locked to responses. The timing of the error-related component measurement windows (ERN: 25–75 ms; late ERN:
75–125 ms; Pe: 300–400 ms) is indicated with gray rectangle. Correctness is distinguished by line color (incorrect = red, correct = green); Object
type is distinguished by line type (weapon = solid, harmless = dashed). Incorrect responses elicited a larger negativity (ERN) and positivity (Pe)
than incorrect responses, with the effect of correctness for harmless objects more broadly distributed and larger over some brain regions. Effect
significance over each scalp region is indicated by a filled rectangle
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Table 7 Simple effects of correctness on Pe amplitudes, as a function of object and electrode position
Harmless

Weapon

Left

Medial

Right

Left

Medial

Right

t(151)

d

t(151)

d

t(151)

d

t(151)

d

t(151)

d

t(151)

d

Anterior

1.17

Anterior-Central

− 2.81*

− 0.10

− 1.98*

− .16

− 1.02

− .08

− 0.42

− 7.47**

− .61

− 5.64**

− .46

− 3.33*

Posterior-Central
Posterior

− 5.20**
N.S.

− .23
–

− 4.10**
N.S.

− .33
–

− 3.77**
N.S.

N.S.

–

N.S.

–

N.S.

–

− .31

− 0.08

− .07

− 2.34*

− .19

− 1.33

− 0.11

–

− 2.91*

− .24

− 5.82**

− .47

− 5.99**

− 0.49

− .27

− 8.25**

− .67

− 4.78**

− 0.39

Paired sample t tests reporting significanceand effect size (Cohen’s d) of Correctness effects on PE amplitudes, as a function of object type (harmless vs. weapon)
across electrodepositions: left, medial, right (LMR) and anterior-to-posterior (ACP). N.S. indicates that the higher order interactions were non-significant and did not
justify t tests at a given scalp location
*p < .05; **p < .001

interactions were followed up by testing for simple effects
of Correctness at each scalp location (see Table 7).
Consistent with prior work, the effects of correctness on Pe were largest over medial anterior-central
and medial posterior-central scalp regions (see Table 7).
Because we were interested in whether the effects of
correctness on Pe amplitude differed as a function
of Emotion, Race, or Object, we conducted an Emotion × Race × Object × Correctness ANOVA at medial
anterior-central and medial posterior-central regions
where Correctness effect sizes were largest. At medial
anterior-central regions, this analysis yielded a marginal Object × Correctness interaction (F(1, 74) = 3.71,
p = 0.058, d = 0.11). Disaggregating this interaction
by Object type found significant effects of Correctness that were larger for harmless objects (Correctness:
t(151) = − 4.11, p < 0.001, d = − 0.33; difference in Pe
amplitude: Incorrect − Correct = 3.02 μV), compared
to weapons (Correctness: t(151) = − 2.34, p = 0.021,
d = − 0.19; difference in Pe amplitude: Incorrect − Correct = 1.41 μV). The Object × Correctness interaction
was not significant at medial posterior-central regions
(F(1, 74) = 0.95, p = 0.333, d = 0.05). Furthermore, there
was no evidence to suggest that the Pe was moderated
by Race, Emotion, or an Emotion × Race interaction
(all interactions involving Correctness × Race, Correctness × Emotion, p > 0.25, statistics reported in supplemental information). Response-locked ERP waveforms
depicting the effect of Object and Correctness on the Pe
can be found in Fig. 6.

Discussion
The main goal of the present study was to examine the
ways in which anger influences the cognitive processing
of irrelevant (race) and relevant (object) stimuli during a
weapon identification task, and whether it impacts task
performance (response times and accuracy). To summarize, our results showed that compared to a neutral
state, anger (1) increased N1 amplitudes in response to

all faces regardless of race, (2) suppressed racially biased
increases in P2 amplitudes in response to Black, compared to White, faces, and (3) suppressed racially biased
increases in N2 amplitude in response to White, compared to Black, faces. Based on existing ERP literatures
on visual N1, P2, and N2 components, we interpret these
findings to suggest that anger (1) increased early automatic attention allocation to all face stimuli even though
they were irrelevant to task goals, (2) decreased vigilance
specific to Black faces, and (3) decreased cognitive control and inhibition processes specific to White faces.
Behavioral results also suggested that anger slowed down
overall response times on the task, especially on trials
involving the correct identification of harmless objects.
Anger, however, did not influence overall accuracy on the
weapon identification task, or sensitivity to race or object
biased errors as indexed by ERN and Pe. Additionally, the
race of primes did not influence task performance or sensitivity to biased errors as indexed by ERN and Pe.
These findings partially support the anger as goal
attainment motivation hypothesis (H2), suggesting that
anger motivates goal attainment by focusing attentional
and memory resources away from task-irrelevant stimuli
like race by suppressing preferential sustained attention
(vigilance) to Black faces (indexed by P2 amplitudes), and
reducing preferential inhibition of White faces (indexed
by N2 amplitudes). This was reflected in angry participants’ slower processing of harmless objects and comparable task performance to neutral participants. Less clear,
however, is whether the effect of anger on N1 amplitudes,
which suggests that anger facilitated automatic attention
allocation to task-irrelevant faces (both Black and White),
fits with H2. Speculations as to how this seemingly contradictory N1 effect might fit with H2 are explored below.
Behavioral responses

Consistent with the threat superiority effect, behavioral
responses during the weapon identification task demonstrated evidence of weapon bias on both response times
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and accuracy. As found in previous research on threat
superiority, participants were more likely to misidentify
harmless objects compared to weapons. They also took
longer to correctly identify objects as harmless compared
to weapons, presumably because of the effort required to
overcome the weapon bias (Blanchette, 2006; Fox et al.,
2007; Pratto & John, 1991; Subra et al., 2018).
Interestingly, anger (compared to neutral) exacerbated
the slowing of correctly identifying harmless objects
compared to weapons, but had no effect on accuracy.
A possible explanation for this pattern of results is that
angry participants took longer to reach certain decisions
during the task because they were making an effort to
correct processing errors and weapon biases before they
feed forward into behavioral errors. This explanation is
consistent with the anger as goal attainment motivation
hypothesis (H2), as well as threat superiority literatures
suggesting that longer response times involved in correctly identifying harmless objects reflect increased cognitive effort involved in overcoming the threat superiority
effect. It also explains why angry participants performed
as well as neutral participants in terms of task accuracy.
Despite previous research showing evidence of race
bias on the weapon identification task (Amodio et al,
2004, 2008; Payne, 2001), the current study found no evidence to suggest that race influences participants’ behavioral responses in terms of accuracy or response time.
We propose two explanations for the failure to replicate
race effects on behavior. First, the racial stereotype that
drives the weapons bias effect may be a specific association linking Black men to handguns, which may not
generalize to Black women or other types of weapons.
Indeed, Payne (2001) used male faces only (Black and
White) and images of handguns only, whereas we used
both female and male faces (Black and White) and images
of a wide variety of weapons (handguns, assault rifles,
knifes, bombs, and nunchucks; See “Appendix”). These
differences in task design may have diluted the impact of
race stereotypes on judgments during the weapon identification task. Unfortunately, we are unable to tease apart
behavioral task performance or neural processing by separate face primes and object types because of overall low
error rates (Merrors = 18.76). Including prime gender and
specific objects would not provide a sufficient number
of errors to assess the effects of correctness, which was
an important factor for both behavioral and responselocked ERP analyses, and raises concerns about statistical
power. However, future studies should examine whether
racial stereotypes related to danger uniquely target Black
men in the context of particular types of weapons.
An alternate explanation for the failure to replicate
past race bias effects on behavior may be the current
moment in American history and societal attention to
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race and racism brought about by the Black Lives Matter movement. In support of that speculation, Sawyer
and Gampa (2018) examined Americans’ implicit and
explicit racial attitudes using data from the research site
called Project Implicit, where people anonymously take
Implicit Association Tests assessing their implicit attitudes toward various social groups. Data from over 1.3
million U.S. citizens between January 1st, 2009 and June
30th, 2016, showed that White Americans’ implicit and
explicit racial attitudes became less pro-White during a
3-year period after July 6, 2013, during the trial related to
the murder of Trayvon Martin, when Black Lives Matter
movement gained significant media attention (Sawyer &
Gampa, 2018), compared to the 4.5 years before. Because
data from the current study was collected after this time
period (2016–2018) when attention to racism was prominent in American consciousness as compared to earlier
periods when the original weapon identification research
was conducted, it is possible that a lack of race bias replication is related to the public consciousness of racism.
This explanation is speculative because we did not measure participants’ racial attitudes. Future studies should
address this limitation by measuring and controlling for
participants’ racial attitudes.
Attention allocation and response inhibition
to task‑irrelevant racial cues

The present study also examined the effects of emotion
and race on the visual N1, P2, and N2 components elicited by faces prior to behavioral responses. These components have been linked to several cognitive processes
across various domains; one prominent interpretation
is that N1, P2, and N2 amplitudes are indices of early
automatic attention allocation, sustained attention (vigilance), and response inhibition respectively. Several studies provide evidence in support of this interpretation, as
discussed in the introduction. That said, we acknowledge
that the interpretation of N1, P2, and N2 amplitudes
remains suggestive.
N1

N1 amplitudes did not significantly differ as a function of
race. The absence of a race effect on the N1 is conceptually similar to ERP research by Ito and Urland (2005),
who reported inconsistent race effects on N1 amplitudes
depending on task complexity. Specifically, they found
that the race of faces had no effect on N1 amplitudes
when faces were presented as irrelevant stimuli during
a complex task. Our weapon identification task was fast
moving and complex, and faces were presented as irrelevant to the goals of the task, making it parallel to Ito
and Urland’s prior work. Thus, the lack of race effects
on N1 amplitudes in this study may be the result of task
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complexity, such that participants successfully ignored
faces in order to meet the task goal of identifying weapons accurately.
N1 amplitudes were however sensitive to emotion, such
that angry participants showed larger N1 amplitudes
compared to neutral participants. This suggests that
anger caused participants to attend more to task-irrelevant face primes. We offer two competing interpretations
of this finding in regard to weapon identification task
performance and the anger as goal attainment motivation
hypothesis (H2). The first is that anger might compromise task performance by facilitating automatic attention allocation to task-irrelevant face stimuli. This would
explain why angry participants took longer to correctly
identify harmless objects as weapons, as redirecting early
attentional resources toward task-irrelevant faces would
increase the amount of effort required to overcome the
threat superiority effect. It would not, however, explain
why overall accuracy was unaffected by anger, nor would
it explain the observed P2 and N2 results suggesting that
anger suppressed the effects of race on vigilance and
inhibition.
A more parsimonious interpretation of the effect of
anger on the N1 component would be that increased
early attentional allocation to faces among angry (compared to neutral) participants facilitated early disengagement from the task-irrelevant face stimuli, preventing
later downstream processing of specific stimulus features
(such as race). This would explain why anger seemed to
increase early attention without regard to race (N1), but
also suppress later race effects on vigilance (P2) and inhibition (N2). Greater early allocation of attention to task
stimuli in general (regardless of relevance) could also
indicate an increase in overall task engagement among
angry participants, which would explain why slower categorization of harmless objects did not come at the cost
of task accuracy. While this interpretation of N1 emotion
effects is consistent with H2, it remains speculative.
P2

Consistent with the anger as goal attainment motivation
hypothesis (H2), Black faces elicited larger P2 amplitudes
than White faces among neutral, but not angry participants. In line with previous research linking the visually
evoked P2 to attention (Anllo-Vento et al., 1998; Hillyard & Münte, 1984; Luck & Hillyard, 1994), the effect
of race on P2 amplitudes was largest at medial anterior
and medial anterior-central regions. From past research
linking larger P2 amplitudes with sustained attention and
vigilance to threats (Carretié et al., 2001; Correll et al.,
2006; Schutter et al., 2004), we interpret our finding to
suggest that neutral participants who showed greater
attentional vigilance to Black compared to White faces
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may have viewed Black faces as more threatening than
White faces. Interestingly, anger induction attenuated
the P2 sensitivity to racial cues. That is, anger induction
reduced threat sensitivity to Black faces, equating them
with White faces. This finding is consistent with previous
research by Harmon-Jones (2019) that suggests anger
motivates goal attainment by suppressing attentional
processing of task-irrelevant information. In this case,
anger motivated greater accuracy on the weapon identification task by suppressing vigilance racial cues that are
task-irrelevant.
N2

Black faces elicited smaller N2 amplitudes than White
faces. However, the distribution of this race effect on
N2 amplitudes across the scalp differed across emotion
condition. Specifically, the effect of race was broadly distributed across anterior and anterior-central regions in
neutral participants, but was observed only at right anterior-central and right posterior-central regions in angry
participants. Because the distribution of the race effect
across the scalp is largely consistent with past research
observing N2 inhibition effects at frontal (i.e., anterior)
regions (Bruin & Wijers, 2002; Pfefferbaum et al., 1985;
Jodo & Kayama, 1992; Falkensten et al., 1999), we interpret the race effect on N2 amplitude as reflecting differences in inhibition of Black and White faces. Indeed,
among neutral participants the effect of race on the N2
component was shown to be strongest at the medial
anterior region, suggesting that they were more likely
to engage in inhibitory processes in response to White
(compared to Black) faces (also consistent with past
research; Correll et al., 2006; Ito & Urland, 2005). Among
participants in the anger condition however, the suppressed distribution of race effects to the right anteriorcentral and right posterior-central regions (as well as
smaller race effect sizes at these regions) may suggest that
the preferential inhibition of White faces was suppressed
among angry participants. As with the P2, we interpret
this as further evidence that anger motivated accurate
object identification through the suppression of inhibitory processes based on irrelevant racial cues (i.e. White
faces), consistent with H2.
Error processing during the weapon identification task

The current study examined both automatic and controlled error processing by targeting the ERN and Pe
respectively as participants engaged in the weapon identification task. Results found a canonical ERN effect, such
that incorrect responses on the weapon identification
task elicited larger ERN amplitudes compared to correct
responses. Consistent with past research, this ERN effect
was largest at medial anterior-central regions, supporting
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extant research suggesting that the ERN propagates from
the anterior cingulate cortex. Contrary to our hypothesis,
no evidence was found to suggest that ERN amplitudes
were sensitive to emotion, race, or object type.
The lack of emotion, race, or object type moderation
of ERN amplitudes is especially interesting given past
research indicating that automatic error recognition
processes are sensitive to racially biased errors on the
weapon identification task and associated with higher
levels of control (Amodio et al., 2004, 2008). However, it
is consistent with the lack of behavioral evidence of racial
bias in the present study. One explanation for the failure
to replicate both race and object bias when comparing
results from the current study to Amodio et al., (2004,
2008) has to do with procedural differences. In Amodio
et al., (2004, 2008), participants were explicitly told that
the misidentification of a tool as a gun following a Black
face prime was “indicative of racial prejudice because it
represented an inappropriate application of Black stereotypes”. In contrast, we did not give any explicit directions to suggest that specific errors were tied to race bias
or object bias. Differences in these results suggests that
automatic error detection processes only detect racially
biased errors when the potential for making such errors
is made salient to participants.
Despite a lack of ERN sensitivity to race or objects, the
Pe effect (indicated by larger positive-going amplitudes
after incorrect responses compared to correct responses)
was sensitive to object bias. Specifically, a larger Pe effect
was detected on trials where harmless objects were misidentified as weapons. This suggests that conscious error
detection and re-evaluation processes were particularly
sensitive to biases in commission of errors that were consistent with the threat superiority effect. Specifically, participants were most conscious of, and likely to re-evaluate
task performance after, misidentifying harmless objects
as weapons. That said, despite greater activation of error
detection and re-evaluation processes following the misidentification of harmless objects, behavioral responses
still indicated significant weapon bias. In other words,
awareness of errors consistent with the threat superiority
effect was not sufficient to prevent participants’ weapon
biases.

Broader implications
Taken as a whole, our findings suggest that future
research aimed at understanding the social cognitive
reasons driving costly errors in weapon misidentification should consider the impact that emotional states,
such as anger, can have on neurocognitive processes
and decision-making. With the exception of the N1, we
found evidence supporting the anger as goal attainment
motivation hypothesis (H2), such that inducing angry
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(compared to neutral) emotional states (1) suppressed
task-irrelevant race-based vigilance and inhibition
processes, (2) increased efforts to overcome the threat
superiority effect (indicated by the slower categorization of harmless objects), and (3) led to overall task
accuracy comparable to that of neutral participants.
Our work shows that anger does not always increase
neurocognitive and behavioral bias. Despite implications
that anger can compromise weapon identification task
performance by facilitating activation of task-relevant
(weapon) and task-irrelevant (race) biases (Baumann
& Desteno, 2010, DeSteno et al., 2004; Dasgupta et al.,
2009; Bodenhausen et al., 1994), our data suggest that
anger may induce goal-oriented behavior that suppresses
vigilance and inhibition to task-irrelevant racial cues and
motivates slower processing of harmless objects.
Results from the current study indicated that controlled (Pe), but not automatic (ERN), error detection
processes were sensitive to errors consistent with threat
superiority (i.e., the misidentification of a harmless
object as a weapon). It remains unclear whether conscious awareness about biased mistakes (indexed by Pe
amplitude) can improve task performance on weapon
identification tasks. Future research should further
probe the role of conscious error detection processes
on biased errors during a weapon identification task.
Should future research find an association between Pe
amplitude and reduction in race and weapon bias on
weapon identification tasks, such a discovery may be
a useful foundation to develop training that relies on
controlled post-error processing to increase accuracy
in threat perception in the lab and in the real world.
Finally, while anger seems to have motivated goal
attainment within our lab task, the effect of anger on
race and object processing may not generalize to realworld instances of law enforcement officers’ interactions with armed and unarmed suspects for at least
three reasons. First, our research was conducted with
undergraduate students, not police officers. Second,
our research context was tightly controlled and devoid
of external stimulation, whereas real-world situations
involve more external stimulation and higher levels of
negative emotion and stress. Third, in our research,
anger was induced by having participants reflect on
past autobiographical events unrelated to the weapon
identification task, whereas in real world law enforcement situations, anger is likely to be elicited by the law
enforcement officers’ interactions with the people they
suspect. Differences in the source of anger and its relation to the situation at hand is likely to be an important
variable that limits generalizability of these findings to
real world law enforcement.
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